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A matinee jacket. A bike with a spinning wheel. A set of car keys. A wind-cheater. The mun-
dane traces of those who vanish. Ordinary objects forced to function as a synecdoche for the
person, a stand-in for the Real. For they are the emblems of trauma, indexical of loss, rep-
resentational of that old familiar sadness: the lost object of desire. Our ordinariness is never
more apparent than in the small things we leave behind; the only remnants left of our person-
hood, our individuality, our very existence. The objects stand in for our fleeting, momen-
tary understandings of subjectivity. If we should vanish, however, these everyday items
assume an importance far beyond their usual capacity to evoke our memory in those who
cared for us. They become iconic, embodying a mystery of their own, a haunting quality
which insists on their own substantive reality even as it suggests the extraordinarily com-
plete lack of the person who owned and used them. The individual is desired yet lost, the
object is found yet essentially unwanted.
This paper will investigate the impact of these trace items through their evocation of the
everyday, and their concomitant and terrifying function as sublime objects in the Lacanian
sense, as positive, material objects elevated to the status of the impossible Thing.1 For, in
looking at these things, we ‘gain an insight into the forbidden domain, into a space that
should be left unseen’.2 These found objects are both meaningful in that they provide ‘evi-
dence’ of an event which we can only ever imagine and never truly know. Yet they are also
meaningless, in themselves merely remnants, symbolising nothing. In this sense, they are the
epitome of terror, the materialisation of the impossible. Any meaning we assign to them
serves only to further obscure the impact of their presence. These discarded objects become




the Real: ‘the rock against which every attempt at symbolisation stumbles, the hard core
which remains the same in all possible worlds (symbolic universes); but at the same time …
is thoroughly precarious; … persist[ing] only as failed, missed, in a shadow, and dissolv[ing]
as soon as we try to grasp its positive nature’.3 For this Real, as Zizek tells us, is precisely
what defines the nature of the traumatic event, producing both a plethora and a lack of sym-
bolisation, constructed backwards from its effects, remaining forever a ‘fantasy-construct’4
defying knowledge and belying the certainty of things.
Marilyn5
21 March 1972, 7.42 am. Fourteen-year-old Eimeo schoolgirl, Marilyn Joy Wallman, dis-
appears while riding her bicycle through the canefields to the school bus stop at the near-
by Rural Youth Hall. Following ten minutes behind her, Marilyn’s brothers come to a dip
in the road where they find her abandoned bicycle. The carrier basket is detached. The bicycle
wheel still spins ominously. Marilyn’s open school port, lunch and books lie scattered on the
road alongside the bicycle. Two drills in from the edge of the cane, a neighbour, Mr Solojinkins,
finds Marilyn’s school hat. A white hat, adorned with blue trim and a band, it appears to have
been thrown.
Grainy black and white images of the crime scene show the discarded bicycle, school bag
and books strewn across the scrub, beside the narrow bitumen road. Wallman’s Road.
Another faded press photograph shows a weary Daphne Wallman standing in her daugh-
ter’s bedroom. The room has been kept the same as the day Marilyn left. The study desk is
neat and tidy. A photograph of Marilyn at primary school graces the desk-top. Fighting back
tears, Mrs Wallman tells the reporter:
The other children don’t touch anything of Marilyn’s. That’s in case she comes home, then
adds wistfully, I suppose it’s only a game of pretence.6
Decades pass. No sign of Marilyn. Instead, Marilyn’s school port and hat are returned to her
parents in pristine condition. Mrs Wallman reflects:
We do what we have to do. But it never leaves you. You see the bike sprawled there and then
there’s nothing at all. It’s like something just came from the sky and ripped her off her bike
and then nothing, nothing.7
——————————
In this paper we’re going to write about things; about the material ties that bind. In doing
so, we’re going to perforce write about ourselves; about how we keep our ‘selves’ anchored
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to the ground through the very things we are most attached to, yet not inevitably conscious
of. We may all be aware of the moments left the living when someone dies, when one chances
upon a teacup, or a hair tie, or a favourite worn out shirt, that once belonged to the one who
is gone, and of how seeing that fragment of that life undoes us, fracturing our fragile accept-
ance of the death, making our loss more real than we ever wanted. However, when one
chances upon the object possessed by someone who has disappeared, the loss is both felt and
not felt simultaneously: the item forces acknowledgement that the person is no longer with
us, yet it fails to completely negate the tantalising possibility of a miraculous return. The
things owned by the disappeared, thus, are different to all other objects, invoking the peculiar
cruelty of the not-known, the forever uncertain.
Here, we will investigate the dual impact of these items, through their evocation of the every-
day, and through their elevation to the status of the sublime object. We will use these things
that mean both nothing and everything at the same time, to attempt to unpack the conun-
drum at the heart of the Real, to show how the ordinary can also be a manifestation of the
impossible and the unsymbolisable. The very nature of these things, as objects discarded or
lost during a disappearance, lends them greater significance than items left behind due to
known and grieved death. For more is expected of these things; the demand that they some-
how tell a story of the inexplicable is insistent; their inability to mask the void of the Real,
the traumatic horror of a vanishing, more evident than at any other time in the life of any
other thing. When someone dies, even if they died tragically and unexpectedly, their things
are not placed in the position of the final witnesses to a completely inexplicable event:
they may help to reconstruct the story of how someone died, but they aren’t asked to do the
impossible and tell us how the person left, nor if there is any possibility that they might come
home. This is the horror the items left by the vanished must face; their inability to provide
any certainty is the horror the searchers for the missing must inevitably confront. Things can’t
suture the rent in communal consciousness that occurs when someone simply disappears,
all they can do is to be inadequate stand-ins for the person, mute witnesses burdened with
more significance than should ever be due them.
Robert Romanyshyn observed in Technology As Symptom and Dream, that our identities are
inextricably linked to the things we own, as we trust them implicitly to ‘function as exten-
sions of ourselves, reflections and echoes of who we are, were, and will become’.8 Lost things,
thus, are troubling to us for more reason than simple inconvenience. For things, according
to Romanayshyn, are ‘witnesses and reflections and producers of our continuing identity’.9
The loss of our things is tragic because it intensifies our relation to death. Displaced or lost
things haunt us and as symptoms of our own selfhood they remind us of a life which has lost
touch with the world.10 Of course, not all things necessarily provoke this reaction of fear
within us. Instead it is rather the things that matter, that can explain us, rather than those
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which have a higher economic price, that are the important, self-reflecting things. Without
these things, those little traces of material culture in our possession, we are not our ‘selves’,
and cannot maintain the pretence of selfhood.
It is hard enough, then, for others to encompass the loss of self evident in items aban-
doned due to death. Imagine, if you will, how much more difficult it is to consider these
vacant articles when someone simply disappears; when someone really is, or could be, in
the very next room, as that trite poem frequently trotted out at funerals suggests. For in these
cases, these precious things that comfort the bereaved, are denied the family and friends of
the disappeared. Instead, they become ‘evidence’, untouchable, non-reclaimable, police prop-
erty, even when the case remains officially ‘open’, but has grown cold. A cold worse than
death, because ‘cold’ cases mean that the disappearance itself is now as abandoned as the
things shelved in boxes in warehouses; things that used to be important, germane to the
missing person search, vital as identifiers should that person be found. Cold cases mean no-
one is going to be found, and even if they were to be located, their precious belongings at
the time of the search would no longer be of use to them. Then even their status as evidence
is revoked. For that person has indeed vanished, grown up, moved on, and may not even
remember or recognise the little keepsakes kept for years in police vaults, sometimes released
finally, and far too late, to the family who will always claim them.
The abandoned things of the disappeared, thus, are terrifying objects. For they suggest
that either the person has had the markers of their identity, the symptoms of their selfhood,
involuntarily removed, or they have deliberately removed them themselves. In either case,
this sloughing off of the self indicates its all too easy removal of such in ourselves. If their
very persons can so easily become our ‘lost objects’, then how easily might we become the
same to others. Keeping our things about us is vital to keep this fear at bay, and to remem-
bering who we are and who they were, but who they can never continue to be.
——————————
Azaria11
Lindy Chamberlain-Creighton describes her daughter:
Azaria was flesh and blood. She laughed and she cried and she talked like you and me. It’s
no good saying, she was only a few weeks old, she was just a baby, and didn’t have a per-
sonality. She knew and she understood.12
Take One. The jumpsuit.
A week after Azaria’s disappearance, tourist Wally Goodwin and his family are walking through
a track near the rockface, close to a dingo’s lair. Wally’s daughter, who is walking a little ahead
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of him, suddenly stops and screams. Wally catches sight of a torn and bloodied baby’s jump-
suit. Years later, Wally tells Lindy that what had frightened his daughter so much ‘was the
fact that the jumpsuit was sitting on its back, slightly concertinaed with the feet rounded
and pointing upwards as if the lower part of the baby’s legs were still inside’.13
Take Two. The black dress.
It’s a plain black dress with contrasting red ribbons and buttons.
The most popular exhibit in the National Museum, it’s been described as ‘the dress that fuelled
a thousand ugly rumours’, and ‘the dress that got tongues wagging and split a nation’.14
Look. Listen. Pause.
Somewhere a disclaimer’s being punched into the keys of an old manual typewriter: ‘This is
not the outfit Azaria was taken in’.
Look. Listen. Pause.
Lindy Chamberlain tells a reporter from the Courier Mail:
‘Yes, we have a black dress. I like black. I made it for Regan. Michael hates it.’15
Take Three. The matinee jacket.
Under cross examination, Lindy describes it as a white knitted Marquis matinee jacket, Size
000, with a pale lemon edging.
According to the Crown it’s a mythical object, a lie, a fabrication.
Five and a half years later, whilst searching for the missing body parts of an English tourist,
a volunteer discovers an item of clothing protruding from the earth.
No limbs. No bones. No blood.
Instead, a baby’s matinee jacket.
Weathered. Faded. Dirt-stained.
Lindy recognises it immediately as Azaria’s jacket.
The yellow edging is still visible.
Traces of elastic wind in and out of the sleeves.
The top button is missing.
In Lindy’s words, the ‘lie’ has been found.16
——————————
There has been much written about the importance of things. Indeed, Bill Brown has even
coined the phrase ‘thing theory’ to describe these various jottings.17 In much ‘thing theory’
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things are considered as one of two vehicles for cultural meaning. They are either gifts or
commodities, and these two categories are often positioned at either ends of a continuum.
As a ‘gift’, a thing usually has more sentimental value, although it may be of practical use
too, and it often symbolises close ties between the giver and the receiver. Commodities, on
the other hand, are impersonal, and there is a distance, frequently a great distance, between
the buyer or receiver of the commodity and its seller or provider. According to some theorists,
a commodity has monetary value, whereas a gift may or may not have economic worth.18
So, it might be surmised, then, that things are indicative of social relationships; either between
kin and friendship networks, or the more impersonal kind found in the broader community.
The things we write of here, however, have no such status. They can’t fit into the neat
gift—commodity continuum proposed by the likes of Bronislaw Malinowski or Lewis Hyde.
For our things are both discarded, dropped, shed, forgotten, and yet at the same time,
they are items of evidence, vital pieces in a heartless puzzle. They acquire that which
Arjun Appadurai has called a ‘cultural biography’19 which has nothing to do with whether
or not they were ever gifts or commodities or something in between. They gain a life of their
own. Their trajectory through life, the experiences they gather if you like, gives them meaning.
They have endured hardship, separation, connection, sentimental significance, and even, 
at times, economic worth, although this is not a prerequisite for a thing to gain a cultural
biography. The thing that becomes a marker of a person manages to surpass its ordinary
‘thing’ status, its own innate nothingness, to transcend itself as evidence of love, selfhood,
disappearance. These things are not inert pieces of metal or plastic or wood, they become
vehicles of meaning, like words they create an ‘informational communication system’.20 In
the case of the disappeared, such things become uncanny, revealing our hidden fears, showing
the emptiness behind all our pretences at wholeness, at selfhood. Their cultural biography
speaks of pain, of loss, of disconnection in a way that no amount of words, regardless of who
speaks them, ever could. The forgotten bicycle lying on the track, once the favourite item 
of its vanished owner; the unusual baby dress used to help convict the child’s mother of
murder, tell us so much more of the truncated lives of these people than expressions of grief,
or sympathy, or revenge. For they testify, in their muteness, their dumb existence, to the
person that was, who once owned and was in some way defined by them. Yet, at the same
time, they still remain stubbornly material: the bike is still just a bike, the dress still just a
dress. They may be used to signify the person who owned them, but they also keep their own
silent counsel, reminding us that we can place too much importance on things, and especially
on things belonging to the vanished. They can only ever give us a momentary glance at the
uncanny, at selfhood itself, before they once again hide in the very substance of their being
at all.
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22 July 1989, 2 am, Ross leaves ‘Steve’ at Taylor Square.
According to him, Warren was in a good frame of mind.






green to hazel eyes
Caucasian appearance
When last seen he was wearing:
Black shoes
Blue jeans
A white turtle neck shirt
And a black sports coat
Shot One. The car.
Two days later, Ross’s friends report him missing to the Paddington Police Station. A report
is logged. They drive down to Marks Park in South Bondi to conduct their own search. In
nearby Kenneth Street, they discover Ross’s car.
A brown coloured Nissan Pulsar. Registration number NZC 783.
The car is locked. There’s no sign of Ross.
Police say there’s nothing unusual about an abandoned car.
Quote ‘this was a regular haunt for homosexuals of nocturnal habits’ Unquote.
Days later, when police search the car they find Ross’s wallet containing $70, his driver’s
license, Visa card, personal papers, and crumpled McDonald’s wrappers.
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Shot Two. The keys.
After finding the car, Ross’s friends discover his car keys.
Eight in total, on a distinctive key ring.
Located in a pocket on a cliff ledge, not far from the water’s edge.
More than a decade later, on a police walk-through video, another friend, ‘Andrew’,23 admits
he was too scared to touch the keys.
He knew then ‘something bad’ had happened to Ross.
Early in 2005, the State Coroner rules that a gang of youths almost certainly threw Ross off
the cliffs.
The detective from the original investigation asserts:
There was no-one else involved.
He may have slipped. He may have jumped.
He suicided. He staged his own disappearance.
The car is locked.
The keys are lost.
They were never fingerprinted.
The detective insists:
The keys were wet.
There was no point.
His mother said:
I spoke to Ross that night.
There was nothing out of the ordinary.
He didn’t jump.
——————————
Our sad fragments are forced to take the place of the individualised, singular person who
has vanished. Instead of misplaced things, so easy to replace in general, we now have mis-
placed people whose things are not easy to replace, which indeed cannot be replaced, because
they must function as evidence of the last moments, indeed the very life itself, of the one
who previously, obliviously, owned them. They in effect become the person, or at least a synec-
doche for that person; a tiny piece now forced to represent the whole. Azaria’s little black
dress, currently displayed in the National Museum, is filled with the missing body of its owner,
even though it didn’t even travel with her to Ayer’s Rock, as it was then commonly known.
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Marilyn’s bicycle, its one wheel ever spinning, embeds itself in one’s consciousness as the
very vehicle of her flight into nowhere, her legs still peddling, her bag and hat still falling.
Ross’s keys lodged in a cliff ledge tell us of his appalling fall onto the rocks, into the sea, while
continuing to indicate his possession of a now suddenly vacant apartment, complete with
his empty clothes, his redundant taste in music, furnishings, art. The things are swamped
with life, while the bodies cannot even tell us of their deaths. We hang on to these ‘effects’
as objects that are out of time, out of communal understanding, out of any continuum com-
monly belonging to things. We can’t let them go—there is nowhere to bury them, to put their
owners to rest. Yet we know that although they are the epitome of presence, they are also the
quintessence of absence; of loss never to be resolved.
These things—this matinee jacket, this set of keys, this bicycle—are now sublime objects
in the Lacanian sense. In looking at these things, we ‘gain an insight into the forbidden
domain, into a space that should be left unseen’.24 Yet, the objects are not in and of them-
selves ‘sublime’; on their own they do not necessarily indicate the forbidden, the hidden.
Rather, they are everyday things, elevated, due to our recognition of their structural posi-
tion, to the level of the ‘impossible-real object of desire’.25 For these things are not indicative
of some other order of objects, beneath which we might unearth the ‘truth’ behind the dis-
appearance cases in which they function. Rather, they, as Lacanian sublime objects, mask
only a void, an emptiness we are all unable to face. They both cover up, and uncover, the
terrifying moment of a vanishing. They are the only witnesses to an inexplicable event;
one we both can’t imagine because it is so cleverly masked; and yet, one we can imagine only
too well through crime scene photos, through empty school bags, discarded keys, weathered
and damaged matinee jackets.
These things left behind force us to witness the incredible. They both provide too much
meaning and not enough. They can tell us something of what has happened, yet at the same
time, reveal nothing. For, as Zizek explains, one cannot get too close to a sublime object. If
one does, it becomes only an ordinary vulgar piece of merchandise; which is, of course, all
it is, and yet that which it must not be. Any meaning we manage to assign these remnants
serves only to obscure further the impact of their presence, which must persist ‘only in an
interspace, in an intermediate state’.26 If we demand to see them in any other setting than
‘from a certain perspective, half seen’,27 they dissipate themselves, precisely because they are
nothing at all.28 The more we look, examine, take apart, reassemble, the less likely we are to
find what we seek. Regardless of what CSI and other such TV programs may show, dis-
carded school bags, old matinee jackets, lost keys, don’t, by themselves, solve disappearance
cases. They merely reach out to us, as presages of the unavoidable eruption of the Real we
are forced to contemplate, but they do so only as chimera.
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Symbolisation is rent through traumatic events, such as the disappearance cases con-
sidered here. There is no real possibility they can ever be ‘read’ through the few things, the
‘clues’, left behind. For trauma automatically indicates a failure to adequately symbolise or
to ‘speak’ the event; any traumatic event must be constituted backwards from its effects.29
The trauma itself remains unspeakable; only the evidence of its impact, on both persons and
things, is really available for analysis. Yet even the impacts are ‘fantasy constructs’, developed
afterwards. In Cathy Caruth’s words: ‘The traumatized [like the things discarded at the sites
of these disappearances] … carry an impossible history within them, or they become them-
selves the symptom of a history that they cannot entirely possess’.30 In other words, the trauma
victim is both repeatedly drawn to the intense ‘reality’ of the event, often including an obsession
with the things that pertain to that event, remaining both unable to shrug it off, yet unable
to live with it. This does not mean that traumatic events cannot be spoken of at all. Rather,
as in Lindy Chamberlain’s case, a story can be told, however, the actual trauma itself, the
sheer horror, the feelings that underlie the neat story structure, cannot be adequately ren-
dered to suit either court or media narratives. The base elements of the tale, who did what,
or said what, and when, and to whom, may be able to be recorded, but this in no way accesses
the fear, the hopelessness, nor the cruelty of nagging hope, lingering always beneath. Trauma
both provides us with the greatest opportunity we will ever have to face the Real directly, yet
perforce demands total numbing, wherein ‘immediacy … may take the form of belatedness’.31
This is largely due to the idea that when people are exposed to traumatic events, they literally
experience ‘speechless terror’ whereby their experience cannot be conveyed in words and
symbols.32 The memory, then, becomes somehow timeless, trapped in an everlasting present
with no possibility of a tomorrow. Those who attempt to speak trauma become wordless,
even when they are most willing to ‘tell their stories’, because they know that ‘their most
complicated recollections are unrelated to time’ and thus can’t be told in classic ‘story’ for-
mation, with a beginning, middle and end.33 Rather, the constant immediacy of the trauma
invokes the numbed belatedness of its telling, leaving only a void in the psyche which can
never be adequately expressed.34 We can’t approach the Real directly, indeed it seems even
‘reality’ is beyond our grasp.
Like psyches, the things left behind are unreliable witnesses. For, in their obstinate existence
they are both unable to entirely mask the horrible void of meaninglessness and impossibility,
and yet are forced, as sublime objects, to appear to do so. In this way, the conundrum of the
Real is allowed to mercifully recede taking both its positivity and its precariousness with it.35
The trace evidence, epitomised by these discarded objects, is thus emblematic of a Real upon
whose ‘rock’ any of our pathetic attempts at symbolisation are dashed. It reminds us again
of the hard kernel at the heart of the Real against which we hammer in search of ‘truth’ or
‘meaning’, but whose incapacity to mean anything defies all our best efforts. Yet, these dis-
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appearance cases, these moments of horrendous lucidity, also demonstrate the precariousness
of the Real, which we have always already failed to catch, which we have ‘missed, in a shadow;
and which ‘dissolves itself as soon as we try to grasp it in its positive nature’.36 We may
see, but we cannot ‘know’. We may collect ‘evidence’, but it will show us only lack. We 
may honour the forgotten relic, but it will only increase our desire for the lost object. The
Real retains its place as a ‘fantasy construct’, then, after which we both pine in our quest
for certainty, even while we are keenly aware of the cruelty of its whimsy.
The few things left behind might well give us a glimmer of the materiality so desperately
craved, yet so impossible, in disappearance cases, but they nevertheless retain a haunting
quality which simultaneously insists on their own physical reality, even as they embody our
overwhelming desire for the one who is lost. They both preserve their sanctity as the
things the vanished person last touched, last held; and they provide incontrovertible evi-
dence of the extraordinarily complete lack of that person, reminding us forever of our ‘lost
object of desire’ indicating both the missing person and our naive faith in continuity.
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